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Abstract
This article looks at the fields of psychoanalysis and psychiatry to read socialist
Yugoslavia’s complex international and political position. It argues that the history
of postwar mental health professions in this country opens up a larger social and
political story of liberalization and authoritarianism in socialist Eastern Europe.
After 1948, the conflict with the Cominform, and split with the USSR,
Yugoslavia went on to receive Western material help, as well as political support,
and developed its own more liberal and internationally open brand of socialism,
predicated on the ideas of workers’ self-management and nonalignment. Yugoslav
psychiatry and psychoanalysis became the most liberalized and Westernized pro-
fessions in the region, but they also contributed to the operation of the violent “re-
education” program at Goli Otok, the most authoritarian and repressive political
project in Yugoslav history aimed at “re-educating” pro-Stalinists in the Yugoslav
Communist Party. In this article, those two sides of the Yugoslav psychiatric pro-
fession will be demonstrated through the prism of self-management. First, the arti-
cle discusses the application of psychotherapeutic techniques and self-management
in the violent context of re-education camps for political prisoners. A similar com-
bination of psychoanalysis and principles of self-management in “civilian” and
Westernized child psychiatry is analysed in the second part. The article shows
how these very similar notions and ideological principles could be used within the
same sociopolitical framework and by the same profession but for radically differ-
ent purposes.
In 1948, Yugoslavia, a newly socialist, revolutionary country, which had just
emerged out of the most devastating conflict in its brief history, experienced yet
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another exceptionally turbulent international episode: its close military, politi-
cal, and ideological relations with the USSR crumbled within a few months,
and Yugoslavia fell out of the Soviet sphere of influence. In June 1948, the
Yugoslav Communist Party (CPY) was expelled from the Cominform, after the
Cominform’s damning resolution accused the CPY of deviating from Marxism-
Leninism and promoting openly anti-Soviet policies and viewpoints.1 The Tito-
Stalin split ultimately benefited Yugoslavia: the country went on to receive
enormous amounts of Western material help, as well as political support and,
even more importantly, developed its own, much more liberal and internation-
ally open brand of socialism, predicated on the ideas of workers’ self-manage-
ment and nonalignment. The Yugoslav regime’s unique position within the
Eastern bloc allowed its leaders to pursue experimental policies and to encourage
rich exchanges with both the Eastern and the Western worlds. However, this
political break had serious consequences for Yugoslav society, and Yugoslavia’s
position was further complicated by geography: it was surrounded by Soviet sat-
ellites, and the possibility of foreign invasion as well as internal treason was a
real one for years. Moreover, the intimate ideological bonds between the
Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Parties could not be broken off so easily, and
many committed Communists’ loyalties remained hopelessly confused.
Importantly, the country’s dangerous departure from the increasingly op-
pressive Soviet zone sparked the most authoritarian and Stalinist-like political
episode in Yugoslavia’s history. Afraid for its survival and fearing popular defec-
tion to the Soviet side in case of invasion, the Yugoslav regime embarked on a
long and thorough purge of its most esteemed cadres.2 Thousands ended in po-
litical prisons, and the regime decided to devise a unique program of “re-
education” for all those former comrades who “failed” to understand the true
meaning of the Soviet-Yugoslav split. A number of “re-education” camps were
established, the most notorious of which was the Goli Otok labor and prison
camp complex, where a brutal psychological experiment was conducted with
tens of thousands of inmates incarcerated on a secluded island off the northern
Croatian coast. Very little has been published on Goli Otok in English, and its
psychiatric aspect remains completely unexplored. This article aims to shed light
on the way psychiatric and psychoanalytic ideas shaped the conceptualization
and realization of this experiment.
But placing Goli Otok in the context of the history of psychiatry also sheds
light on another important historiographical conundrum. For many years, schol-
ars of socialism and of Yugoslavia remained puzzled by the brutal and repressive
nature of Tito’s anti-Stalinist initiative in 1949. The episode was particularly
confusing because this increasingly authoritarian period was followed by a period
of important social, cultural, and political liberalization as the country searched
for alternatives to Stalinist socialism. This article will demonstrate that the
state’s liberal turn was not in fact a break from what came before. The harsh pur-
suit of suspected Stalinists after 1948 was predicated on the same core principles
that motivated Yugoslavia’s subsequent partial democratization. The theories of
self-management, “creative initiatives” from below, and the decentralization of
the political system guided liberalization in Yugoslavia, but they were also put
into operation—although in a very altered form—very early on, in the repres-
sive context of Goli Otok. Moreover, Yugoslavia’s non-Stalinist, reform
Communism was dependent on particular ideas of individual psychological
180 Fall 2016Journal of Social History
development and emancipation, and these became increasingly connected to
and informed by specific psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic concepts. The
combination of psychological reform and self-management marked Yugoslavia’s
experimentation with different forms of socialism in radically different social
and political spheres. By focusing on the ideological continuities between the
organizing principles of the camp and psychiatric, social, and cultural practices
outside of it, this article will place Goli Otok firmly in the context of
Yugoslavia’s early experimentation with alternatives to Stalinism. It shows that
the concept of self-management could be combined with various psychothera-
peutic and psychoanalytic theories both in violent camps and in Westernized
psychotherapeutic consulting rooms, in order to achieve rather different results
in the realm of re-education. But even when it was implemented in the extreme
context of violence and coercion in the camps, it still retained the connotation
of personal growth, development, and ultimate liberation—although at Goli
Otok, that liberation was to be achieved through a complete destruction and
unraveling of the inmate’s “treacherous” personality.3 Psychoanalysis and psy-
chotherapy were thus instrumental for both—unraveling and rebuilding.
In the aftermath of WWII and the split, Yugoslav psychiatry and psycho-
analysis became the most liberalized and Westernized professions in the region,
but they also contributed crucially to the operation of the violent re-education
program at Goli Otok, the most authoritarian and repressive political project in
Yugoslav history. Postwar psychoanalysis and psychiatry thus provide a useful
lens through which to study the complicated and unexpected political alliances
of the Cold War: of all the socialist countries, it was in Yugoslavia only that psy-
choanalysis thrived, received generous material and logistical support from the
state, and became the most internationalized of all medical professions. From
the early 1950s on, Yugoslav socialist psychoanalysis adopted the fundamental
theoretical and practical assumptions of the French and British psychoanalytic
schools and became a full-fledged member of the Western European psychoana-
lytic community, developing a rich culture of professional exchange with
Western European as well as American colleagues.4 But Yugoslav psychoanalysts
and psychiatrists were also involved in more authoritarian “re-education” proj-
ects, in political abuses, and in the subsequent Eastern European psychiatric and
pedagogical networks.5 While the Yugoslav socialist regime allowed freedoms
and opportunities unmatched in the socialist world, it also devised exceptionally
brutal and oppressive measures to deal with opponents it considered particularly
dangerous. From the early 1950s, Yugoslav psychiatrists and psychoanalysts regu-
larly traveled to Western Europe and the United States on state fellowships in
order to complete specializations and educational trainings and supervision;
their work gradually became suffused with the ideas of direct democracy, liberali-
zation of the self, and self-fulfilment. But at the same time, the Yugoslav state
was equally interested in Soviet-style psychiatric experiments, and sent mental
health professionals “to the West” in order to gauge prison psychiatric practices
in the Soviet Union.6
In socialist Yugoslavia, therefore, in every facet of society, psychiatry and
psychotherapy became instrumental in shaping and reshaping minds, experi-
menting with new political ideas, and in building, as the Communist Party
called it, a genuine democracy. Psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic theories
became increasingly important for understanding and developing the notions of
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individual enlightenment and self-management that underpinned Yugoslavia’s
reform Communism. In turn, various philosophical and sociological interpreta-
tions of self-management shaped the Yugoslav, Marxist version of psychoanalysis
and encouraged its practitioners to think in more activist and politically engaged
terms. In order to analyze this process, this article focuses on two distinct con-
texts in which psychoanalytic ideas affected political developments: prisoner re-
habilitation in Goli Otok and the field of child psychiatry and psychoanalysis.
In Goli Otok, the project of individual reformation took on an exceptionally vi-
olent guise, but it was informed by the same psychiatric and psychoanalytic prin-
ciples that shaped the theory and practice of child psychology. Moreover,
psychiatrists were centrally involved in these explicitly political enterprises,
whether as liberal professionals or as contributors to the idea of violent re-educa-
tion, and offered elaborate psychological interpretations of Marxist/Communist
concepts and of the importance of self-management. This article will explore
these two sides of the Yugoslav psychiatric profession through the prism of self-
management. I will demonstrate how very similar notions and ideological princi-
ples could be used within the same sociopolitical framework and by the same
profession but for radically different purposes.
The Search for Genuine Democracy: Self-Management
After 1949 the Yugoslav political system saw itself almost exclusively as an
ideological antithesis to the USSR, a “really existing negation of the concept of
state socialism” and central planning.7 It began searching for an alternative ideo-
logical and political basis for legitimation, which would move away from
Stalinist totalitarianism without endangering the socialist essence of the
Yugoslav revolution. In 1949, Kardelj suggested that socialism meant “such an
organization of a people’s community which would represent a mutual coopera-
tion of equal, free people” and would eliminate “a uniformity imposed from
above and hierarchical subordination to the centre.”8 Already by the early
1950s, the most important ideologues of Yugoslav Communism developed their
doctrine of socialist workers’ self-management, which was partly based on
Engels’ notion of the “state that withers away,” on Marx’s early writings and
analysis of the Paris Commune, and on Gramsci’s theories and partly inspired by
the Yugoslav Communists’ wartime experiences of popularly elected and popu-
larly responsible committees/councils. The state soon implemented a set of legis-
lative measured aimed at economic and political decentralization and “de-
bureaucratization” through workers’ councils and gradual democratization of cul-
tural and social life. Such reforms, of course, stopped well short of introducing a
multiparty political system and disbanding the political monopoly of the
Communist Party, but they did de-Bolshevize Yugoslav socialism and ultimately
helped build a more pluralistic society.
The fateful year of 1948 was not only marked by the bitter dispute with the
USSR but also by a widespread sense of disappointment with the revolution, es-
pecially among Partisan resistance veterans. After their wartime experiences
with radical politics and with the direct political participation of the masses
through people’s committees, Partisan veterans in Yugoslavia had a very differ-
ent take on Party politics and military/political hierarchies. For instance, former
Communist soldiers in Vukovar, Croatia, were, according to one official
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Croatian Communist Party report, feeling “neglected, isolated, lonely and hope-
lessly abandoned to their own devices” and had no opportunity to participate in
the political reconstruction of the country. Even the local councils of veterans’
organizations were deemed “declarative” and “delegate bodies” and were hardly
aware of the social problems of their region; they met rarely, assumed either a
passive or a technocratic/bureaucratic attitude, and appeared to provide very lit-
tle opportunity for true political participation.9 When the IB Resolution criti-
cized the Yugoslav Party, among other things, for subverting democratic
procedures, this became a hot topic of debates at Party cell meetings throughout
the country.10 The issue of social stratification and material privileges of Party
administrators was an even more sensitive topic in a young socialist state.11 As
Goli Otok inmate Peter Komnenic wrote, 1948 was in fact a clash between the
careerists and the honest, humble Communists: “True partisans didn’t know
how to climb the ladder to the very top, with intrigues, behind-the-scenes calcu-
lations . . . they remained confused in their human and Communist pride.”12
Alarmingly for the political leadership, some of the former participants in
the Partisan army were growing alienated from the emerging authoritarian
Communist state and compared it unfavorably to the wartime experience of bot-
tom-up initiatives, pluralism, and people’s committees.13 Of all Goli Otok pris-
oners between 1949 and 1956, around 40 per cent were veterans of Partisan
guerrilla warfare, the elite of the socialist revolution.14 These people often un-
derstood the Resolution and discussions around the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict as
an opportunity to critique what they considered to be the deviations of
Yugoslav socialism—the increasing authoritarianism of the state machinery.
The Yugoslav state’s experiment with self-management was, to an impor-
tant extent, a response to veterans’ and Party members’ critiques of the emerging
internal political structure rather than merely a reaction to the Soviet assault or
to Yugoslav Communists’ supposed primary allegiance to the Soviet Union.15
Even though the late 1940s and early 1950s saw many of them imprisoned and
accused of treacherous pro-Stalinist loyalties, their words and concerns were
nevertheless heeded and adopted. And in that sense, it was not all that surpris-
ing that self-management was practiced for the first time in the hellish condi-
tions of Goli Otok. When it came to conceptualizing re-education and
imprisonment, the 1948 conflict was an internal Party affair, and it meant that
the inmates would be treated as a special category of prisoners. In fact, Goli
Otok was meant to function as both a torture chamber and a Red University, in
which “misled” comrades were brought back to the proper ideological path and
not written off or executed as in Stalin’s Soviet Union. This, ironically, pro-
duced unprecedented brutality: in imprisoned partisans’ memoirs, diaries, and
autobiographies, the very concept of self-management within the camp was
marked as the most distressing circumstance, and former inmates described in
great detail how they felt when their former wartime comrades inflicted im-
mense physical and psychological humiliation upon them. This may go some
way towards explaining the ultimate failure of the self-management experiment
in Yugoslavia: its extremely authoritarian roots in 1949 marked the practice of
self-management outside the prisons, and it is particularly striking that, even in
the 1960s and 1970s, bottom-up self-managing structures in factories and politi-
cal organizations were almost regularly set up and elaborated “from above.”16
The Pedagogy of Workers’ Self-Management 183
The Pedagogical Value of Self-Management and Coercive Re-Education
In his seminal work on the Yugoslav split with the Cominform, Ivo Banac
rightly argues that the Yugoslav government’s repressive response to perceived
enemies of the state in 1948 and after was far from a straightforward struggle for
liberalizing or de-Stalinizing society. In fact, it constituted the most authoritar-
ian phase in the history of Yugoslav socialism, which was essential for establish-
ing the Communists firmly in power and comparable to the Soviet
collectivization drive and political terror of the 1930s. Banac adds that the
Yugoslav leadership made a crucial decision in 1948 not to treat suspected
Cominformists any differently from all other enemies of the state; in fact, the
grand anti-Stalinist initiative of Tito’s regime proved to be the most Stalinist
move in his entire career.17 While Banac’s argument regarding the paradoxically
Stalinist anti-Stalinism of 1948 is insightful, it is worth asking whether the pe-
nal and psychological strategy for dealing with pro-Soviet Yugoslav prisoners
was entirely identical to Soviet practice. In fact, memoirs and descriptions of in-
mates’ experiences at Goli Otok and an array of related prison camps point in a
different direction: these prisoners were, in fact, treated in an exceptional man-
ner, and in this sense they represented a unique, category of prisoner. The sys-
tem of “re-education” developed in the Goli Otok system was aimed precisely at
those Communist comrades who breached the Party’s trust—and while it may
have been Stalinist in its cruelty, breadth, and violence, it was ideologically de-
veloped in opposition to Stalinist centralism and relied on the notion of pris-
oners’ self-management. In that way, Goli Otok can be seen as an experimental
ground, in which practices of bottom-up self-management were tested and coor-
dinated from above, with grotesque and uniquely inhumane results. Moreover,
psychoanalytic strategies were coupled with self-management to produce a terri-
fyingly successful model for breaking even the most resilient: to each other, pris-
oners were forced and expected to admit “every little dirty thought,” to the
extent that, as one former inmate admitted after having emigrated, he still felt
guilty for not admitting to the collective that he had had hostile thoughts about
escaping the camp.
Just as Yugoslav socialism after 1948 would become famous for the applica-
tion of the ideology and practice of workers’ self-management, Goli Otok was
characterized by a specific “self-managing” structure among the prisoners. Since
Goli Otok mainly held Communist Party members, whose membership often
ran for decades and dated from well before the war, the system of re-education
had to be conceived differently, and it ultimately aimed to convey the message
that the imprisoned comrades understood the magnitude of their mistakes and
could lead themselves and their colleagues out of the blunder, with the CPY’s
generous help. In fact, as former inmate Emilijan Milan Kalafatic testified, those
who had “revised” their attitude had to repeat every single day at various local
political meetings and classes, in front of the other prisoners, that “Yugoslavia
was the only socialist country in the world, [and] celebrate the theory of the
withering away of the state, although it was clear to everyone that the state ap-
paratus of violence remained in its entirety, and was even augmented.” This was
the cornerstone of Yugoslavia’s theory and application of workers’ self-manage-
ment after the 1950s, and, as we can see, it was first formulated and discussed in
the violent context of Goli Otok.18 As Edvard Kardelj wrote as early as 1949,
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“attracting the masses to the state” would be completed “in such a way that
each person will for some time be a bureaucrat”19—in the hellish rendering of a
Red University in Goli Otok, each prisoner would also be a police investigator
and re-educator, so that the group of offenders would be drawn back to the
Yugoslav state as efficiently as possible.
Indeed, many former inmates testified that, the lower the level of the
camp’s organization, the less visible any representatives of state authority (such
as policemen) were, giving the impression that the most “advanced” and “re-ed-
ucated” prisoners mostly ran affairs and conceptualized the camp’s program. As
former inmate Dragoslav Mihailovic remembered, the increasingly porous
boundary between the inmates and their keepers (policemen, guards, police in-
vestigators) further complicated the situation, making the experience of incar-
ceration even more difficult to handle, since there could develop no real
community of the imprisoned, no internal moral code of behavior.20 Other
memoirs argued that self-management was introduced so that all inmates would
be tainted, so that all would participate in the crime. Many former inmates un-
derstandably saw the invention of self-management as an expression of the ulti-
mate malice of the camp’s ideologues: for Putnik, “this was the way to put the
inmate in a situation in which he could never raise his head after his release, let
alone condemn the system of “re-education.” Because, “it was he himself who
created it and took part in it.”21 According to psychiatrist Todor Bakovic, “it
was not the policeman who beat and tyrannized, but the prisoner.”22 Inmates
served as re-educators, investigators and executioners; statements were not given
to the police but to a room full of coprisoners and comrades.
Goli Otok was characterized by an elaborate hierarchy of prisoners, who
were all forced to take part in each other’s “re-education” process, a complex sys-
tem designed to induce a radical differentiation among the camp’s population.
In fact, the camp’s unique “apparatus of compulsion” rested on the core idea
that prisoners should handle each other with their own hands, and the camp’s
machine became extremely efficient and self-propelled precisely because it soon
appeared that the police meddled very little in these “internal” reckonings
among inmates. In this imposed “internal” differentiation, all prisoners were led
to believe that “those . . . who saw and understood their own betrayal ask and
force the others to do the same.”23 All the camps and prisons within the com-
plex had their own centers of prisoners’ self-management, which were nominally
run by the inmates themselves but were effectively under the watchful eye of
the police investigators. Each center had its own leader, deputy, foreman, and
officer in charge of cultural affairs. This leadership structure was then replicated
at the level of cells or barracks. Each cell or barrack was further organized into
collectives (similar to Communist front organizations), while a small number of
members of each collective also belonged to actives (those who made up the
“re-education” vanguard in the prisoners’ community). Barrack heads (room
wardens) were also prisoners who had proved to the police investigators the au-
thenticity of their political “revision,” and these persons controlled the ideologi-
cal and political aspect of the re-education at this basic structural level within
the camp’s organization—in many ways, what happened in barracks, where all
inmates returned each night, determined the prisoners’ future.
It was this unique structure which insured that each inmate’s immediate su-
pervisor was his or her coprisoner.24 In his interview with historian Vladimir
The Pedagogy of Workers’ Self-Management 185
Dedijer, former head of the Goli Otok camp Ante Rastegorac, one of the most
unreliable witnesses of this experiment, claimed that the differentiation among
the prisoners came about spontaneously, as a form of “partisan initiative” from
below, once people’s “illusions began to break down,” which led to physical con-
flicts between inmates of opposite opinions. Moreover, “quite a few even started
treating the police investigators as their true comrades.”25 The psychological sys-
tem implemented at Goli Otok thus made it possible for Rastegorac to interpret
the excesses of torture and other maltreatments at the camp as a result of sponta-
neous political differentiations and enmities in the prisoner population, of which
the investigators were supposedly often not aware. In barracks, the room warden
was to supervise the implementation of all measures of compulsory psychological
and physical re-education—if necessary “strictly, ruthlessly, brutally.” Moreover,
if the room warden failed in doing that, he or she might be branded as a “hypo-
crite” or even demoted to the camp’s lowest category of bandits. According to
inmate Milinko Stojanovic, room wardens were allowed—even incited—to use
their own imagination and personal ability to “improve the system of re-educa-
tional methods,” and some were eager to take this opportunity. Their role was
not only to personally pressure the inmates to cooperate, but also to organize the
entire collective in order to achieve this goal.26
Finally, each barrack had its own share of “bandits”—those who still failed
to comply, self-criticize and admit their own dangerous past, and who were sub-
jected to various degrees of physical and psychological torture: “boycott.”
Nobody was allowed to communicate to the “bandits”; they were allocated the
hardest and often most meaningless forms of exhausting physical labor.
Moreover, higher-ranking prisoners—members of the collectives or activists—
were tasked with the “re-education” of the bandits, and making their time at the
camp as miserable and psychologically devastating as possible. In fact, in order
to remain an activist, one had to not only to fully “revise” his attitudes, “clear
his investigation,” and demonstrate a complete and accurate understanding of
the Yugoslav position in its conflict with the USSR; one also needed to prove
his “revision” in practice, by using any means available to “persuade” the “ban-
dits” to change their orientation as well and join the collectives. In reality, this
meant that all the activists had to excel in “chasing up” the bandits, in “exerting
measures of psycho-physical methods of compulsion,” and in “making the ban-
dits’ life as unbearable as possible: by cursing, yelling at, even hitting the ban-
dits.”27 This was indeed the true test of the validity of their “rebirth” as honest
Communists. If they were suspected of faking their pressure on the bandits, the
activists were likely to be demoted and relieved of their previous privileges
within the camp, sometimes even severely punished. Furthermore, the activists
made up the core element of the internal system of reporting, and were required
to always carefully observe the behavior of members of the collectives, to watch
for “passivists” and hypocrites, and to submit regular reports to room wardens
and police investigators. As a result of this system, Goli Otok prisoners experi-
enced most of their physical and psychological traumas not at the hands of the
police but at those of their comrades, many of whom they had known quite well
before their incarceration.
It was in the context of these collectives and actives, made up of one’s
coprisoners and cosufferers, that the most important decisions about one’s fate at
Goli Otok were made. Every inmate’s “revision” had to begin in his own
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barrack, where his statements were discussed and (violently) reacted to by the
rest of the community. Although this appeared to be a process entirely run and
controlled from below—and all inmates were instructed to aid their coprisoners
on their path to “re-education”—almost all former Goli Otok convicts agree
that the collective’s treatment of those making public declarations in their bar-
racks was carefully planned and closely monitored and orchestrated by the po-
lice. The declarations had a precise, pre-arranged script, and only rarely would
someone deviate from it. After the room warden set the tone by characterizing
himself as a former traitor who subsequently saw the depth of his own betrayal,
all the others had to follow suit: it was important to always ascertain that there
were no innocents at the camp, and that “there could be no heroes at Goli
Otok, only re-educated arrestees.”28 In front of everyone, these inmates were in-
structed to declare their dedication to brutally fighting the enemy and the ban-
dits within the camp—and they were then expected to prove their statements in
practice. These were two central elements in the camp’s re-educational system:
insistence on brutal, disintegrating self-criticism and self-contempt, and declara-
tion of intent to help in applying similar re-education methods to other
prisoners.
Declarations were loud, violent, often very unruly affairs. The declaration
moment was particularly stressful and dangerous: the inmate who was presenting
his attitude found himself in the center of the room, and was prodded by the
room warden as well as the activists to admit “what you did, what you used to
think, what you are thinking now.”29 Another inmate, Mihovil Horvat, de-
scribed particularly aggressive declaration sessions when the inmate giving the
statement would say something “wrong,” unacceptable: “The warden impercep-
tibly communicated to the collective what he wanted. With roaring and bellow-
ing, hungry beasts jumped out of their cages, ready to dismember the victim. . . .
Cries, screeches, screams, death covered in and supported by paroles, anger car-
ried on the wings of the ancient hatred of the species towards a deviating indi-
vidual, hits as an obvious manifestation of belonging, spitting as a sign of
rancour, deformed faces as an expression of a complete determination to destroy
the victim.”30 The questioning of the inmates under such circumstances could
take different turns. At times, the group was more lenient, and ready to “discuss”
whatever ideological points or international events the inmate highlighted as
unclear to him, but discussions were never free. In most cases, however, activists
helped create a volatile atmosphere, screaming insults as the inmate declared his
former “treason,” demanding that he tell the entire truth, and yelling slogans in
support of Tito and the CPY. Moreover, all had to take part in the
questioning—the refusal to participate could mean a demotion within the
camp’s hierarchy and could lead to a renewed boycott.
The Goli Otok camp drew considerably upon early Soviet jurisprudence
and its conceptualization of punishment as an opportunity for rebirth and reha-
bilitation. The 1920s Soviet prisons and labor colonies had applied a striking set
of measures in order to re-educate political offenders, common criminals, and ju-
venile delinquents, as could be seen, for instance, at the Solovetsky labor camp,
the Bolshevo camp for juvenile delinquents, and at Anton Makarenko’s Gorky
colony for delinquent, orphaned, and/or homeless children in Kharkov.31 All of
these had highlighted—more or less cynically—the goal of re-education and po-
litical and moral rehabilitation and had vehemently insisted on the principles of
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prisoners’ self-government inside the camps. Similar to Goli Otok, these early
Soviet prisons paid substantial attention to organizing cultural, artistic, and edu-
cational programs, as well as compulsory political discussion classes. As Peter H.
Solomon has argued with regard to the NEP period, “the prison administration
also adopted for Soviet prisons what was generally seen as the most advanced
way of organizing the internal life of prisons—the progressive stages system—
according to which a prisoner passed through a series of stages with progressively
attractive regimes, in accordance with the progress of his rehabilitation.”32
At Goli Otok, however, this self-managing structure of prisoner rehabilita-
tion had another unique trait: it was centrally shaped by a host of psychothera-
peutic and psychoanalytic concepts and practices that guided Goli Otok’s
project of personal evaluation on both individual and group levels. In fact, the
Yugoslav camp placed heavy emphasis on psychotherapeutic and analytic tech-
niques and concepts and seemed to be particularly interested in introspection,
self-exploration, and self-knowledge. It was as though the entire process of in-
vestigation, confession writing, and interrogation primarily served as a basis for
personal, psychological growth. In his work on the narrative structures of
Soviet-era autobiographies and confessions, Igal Halfin argues that the ultimate
goal of the Communist leaders was to achieve the absolute self-transparency of
the Party membership and the population at large.33 In order to fulfil this aim,
Soviet authorities demanded that their subjects engage in constant, relentless
life-writing and soul-searching—potential Party members as well as those ar-
rested on suspicion of political treason were expected to always write and rewrite
their own stories of conversion to Bolshevism and of past sins and betrayals, and
these had a very similar overarching structure. They closely resembled, Halfin
believes, classical religious texts and eschatology, and all relied on narrating the
moral destruction of the pre-Bolshevik or sinful personality of the writer, glorify-
ing his or her ethical and political growth following ideological awakening.
These autobiographies in fact turned into stories of self-discovery. Similarly, pris-
oners of Goli Otok and related camps were also forced to write detailed auto-
biographies. In fact, Goli Otok’s eerie focus on self-exploration, which went
hand in hand with physical torture and brutally harsh labor, made it a rather
unique institution in the Communist world. Very much inspired by Soviet
Communist Party and NKVD practices of extracting confessions and redefining
subjectivities, Goli Otok made use of a variety of psychiatric and psychoanalytic
techniques in order to penetrate the depths of the prisoners’ supposedly criminal
mindsets and to reform them.
Arguably, it was precisely this combination of psychoanalytic working on
the self and structural outlines of self-management that made the camp both ter-
rifying and extremely successful in breaking the prisoners. As Steven Barnes has
demonstrated, the Gulag hardly dispensed with the idea of “correcting” prisoners
and combined violence, brutal forced labor, and physical exhaustion with sys-
tematic attempts at engineering a “total human transformation” of the inmates.
Barnes’ analysis of reformist attempts in the Gulag generally focuses on political
re-education and ideological indoctrination. In partial contrast, Goli Otok was
exclusively about inner psychological restructuring and self-transformation. This
reliance on psychological and psychoanalytic ideas of development and reform
may have constituted the core difference: unlike in the Soviet Union, the late
1940s and 1950s in Yugoslavia were marked by the striking ascent of
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psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic ideas. As the country was reorienting its
foreign policy away from the USSR, Yugoslav mental health professionals were
increasingly drawn to Western psychoanalytic centers, and psychoanalytic theo-
retical frameworks and practices grew to be very influential within the country’s
psychiatric profession.34 Moreover, even before 1948, Yugoslav discussions of
WWII psychological trauma were dominated by psychoanalytically minded pro-
fessionals such as Hugo Klajn, Stjepan Betlhaim, and Vladislav Klajn. The grow-
ing influence of psychoanalysis in the psychiatric and medical professions
outside the camp helped mold the techniques used at Goli Otok, alongside the
Soviet concept that a Communist personality was redeemed and built through
constantly seeking self-knowledge.
In a rare analysis of the psychiatric aspects of Goli Otok “re-education,” psy-
chiatrist Todor Bakovic proposed that the camp’s principles of self-management
were deliberately devised to rest on the psychoanalytic concepts of ambivalence
and projection. Bakovic’s statement regarding the straightforward and inten-
tional application of psychoanalysis by Yugoslavia’s police authorities is difficult
to prove, however, given the extremely limited access to Goli Otok-related po-
lice archives and sources. Nevertheless, the resemblance between certain trends
in immediate postwar Yugoslav “civilian” psychoanalysis and some of Goli
Otok’s most important techniques is striking; moreover, some mental health
professionals straddled the worlds of therapy and police investigations. One such
figure was Yugoslavia’s leading postwar analyst and military psychiatrist
Vladislav Klajn. In rethinking the role of psychoanalysis in a Marxist society,
Klajn35 proposed and then implemented a curious combination of techniques
that significantly decreased the length of analysis, and sought to give the analyst
a more direct and powerful leadership role in the process. It is likely that there
was an intellectual link between this more authoritarian version of psychoanaly-
sis and the psychological re-education that was implemented in the Goli Otok
camp. Klajn proposed that when it was applied to “primitive,” “undereducated”
or “intellectually less elevated patients,” the psychotherapeutic method needed
to be more active, more “authoritative”; in short, the therapist had to lead pa-
tients and “force them to active cooperation.”36 For Klajn, Freud’s insights con-
stituted an invaluable contribution to understanding the psyche and
mechanisms of mental illness. However, Klajn soon developed into a rather un-
orthodox “socialist psychoanalyst,” attempting to devise an approach appropri-
ate to Yugoslavia’s particular profile. He mostly shunned long-term sessions in
favor of shorter, more intense treatments, in which the importance and strength
of consciousness and ego were emphasized over the unconscious, and he concep-
tualized the therapist as akin to a tutor who directed his patients in a firm, disci-
plined and, if necessary, heavy-handed manner, while dispensing “guidance”
much more straightforwardly than an orthodox psychoanalyst.37 Importantly,
Klajn was also a high-ranking officer of the Yugoslav state police and a lecturer
at the Federal State Police’s Polytechnic. Due to his tight connection with po-
lice and military structures throughout the 1950s, recent research has related
him and another psychiatrist from within the state police, Dr. Svetislav
Popovic, to experiments and developments at Goli Otok.38 Moreover, Klajn
himself worked as the head of the neuro-psychiatric ward at the Belgrade hospi-
tal Dragisa Misovic, whose director was the senior physician for the Goli Otok
prisoners and whose doctors regularly treated the camp’s inmates as well as the
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Yugoslav regime’s highest functionaries (in his ward, Klajn introduced and su-
pervised analytic psychotherapy for neurotic patients). But even if Klajn was not
directly connected to the Goli Otok experiments—and the exact nature of his
involvement remains unclear as the relevant archives have so far been unavail-
able to researchers—his conceptualization of “socialist psychoanalysis” as a more
authoritarian version of psychotherapy informed by certain analytic categories
probably influenced the formulation of violent “therapeutic” techniques at the
camp, especially since he regularly lectured to state police employees.
In some of the most important practices at Goli Otok, the influence of psy-
choanalytic and psychotherapeutic concepts and insights was painfully visible.
In the international context of violent re-education camps of the 1950s, Goli
Otok was exceptional in its heavy emphasis on psychotherapeutic and analytic
techniques and concepts and its attendant and almost exclusive focus on intro-
spection, self-exploration, and self-knowledge. It was as though the entire pro-
cess of investigation, confession writing, and interrogation primarily served as a
basis for personal, psychological growth. In former inmate Rade Panic’s book
based on his memories of Goli Otok, the room warden utters the following in-
troductory words before the ritual “declarations of attitude” by a group of
prisoners:
To revise or not to revise, this seems to you as a small difference. It’s not. It’s
everything. It’s your life. It’s up to you what you will do with it. Until yesterday,
I was just like you, a bandit, a stubborn foreign hireling, maybe not personally
but certainly objectively speaking an agent of the Comintern. Then I saw the
light. This should be your starting point, this realization that you are all bandits
and traitors.39
Confessions thus did not serve to reveal the truth to the police—the police had
already discovered it. Former inmate Vera Cenic testified that, even though the
Goli Otok investigators always claimed that “the Party already knew every-
thing,” she had been constantly pressed to “spit out everything, absolutely every-
thing, and the Party would then ascertain how honest and prepared [she] was to
revise her position.”40 Unlike in the Soviet show trials, such confessions did not
have any public, propagandistic, or political function either, given that the fate
of Goli Otok’s prisoners was hidden from the eyes of the wider population, and
most of the inmates were never tried or convicted but only received “administra-
tive sentences.” But the purpose of inmates’ public declarations and self-criticism
was precisely this self-realization, guided self-knowledge—that, even though
they might not have been conscious of it or purposely engaged in treason and
malicious endeavours, every single arrestee was harboring negative dispositions
towards his or her own Party and state and was in need of a political and ethical
“rebirth.” Goli Otok then served to make each prisoner conscious of these ma-
levolent traits in his or her own personality.
Even though it was a physically brutal labor camp, Goli Otok allotted its in-
mates more than enough time for such self-reflection. The very living condi-
tions, in a setting of bleak isolation, were supposed to induce introspection. The
infamous investigation (istraga) never ended here: as there was no trial or con-
viction, there could be no end to such intimate, soul-searching investigations.
On average, every inmate wrote and submitted between twenty and thirty
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statements in the course of their istraga, and the very process of statement writ-
ing and revision was central to the re-education program.41
These life narratives were not focused on particular (real or imagined)
crimes; they had to encompass the inmate’s entire life, both rational and irratio-
nal spheres of his or her personality, and always started in early childhood.
Women’s camp commander Marija Zelic Popovic, whom most remember as an
extremely physically brutal figure, would herself later recall how she strove to
help the inmates realize and understand their “true” nature, of which many had
not even been aware—that they were traitors and unreliable, that they had
harbored negative and pernicious thoughts against their own Party and enmity
towards the state—and to assist them to “unburden” themselves of such orienta-
tions and potentials. Although Popovic had no medical, psychiatric, or psycho-
analytic training, she approached her task of restructuring the inmates’
personalities in explicitly medical terms: “With each inmate I get her file, just
like each patient is accompanied by a medical case history. . . . Now I see who I
am really dealing with.” The files also contained a “diagnosis” or at least an
opinion of the police investigator in the first instance. Popovic then adopted
the role of a stern and authoritarian analyst, who pressed the inmates to tell and
retell, to reconstruct and examine their past decision-making until they realized
the underlying source of their betrayal. She suggested how “they were sometimes
not even aware of the path they had started walking down” and related her own
traumatization as a result of this process because she had to deal with the in-
mates’ “resistances” to this process of self-realization.42 In most cases, this relent-
less search for “hidden” treacherous thoughts implied a purely fictional
reconstruction of such ideas, which likely never existed but had to be spelled
out as unconscious.
It was in order to help this process of “unearthing” and self-discovery that
the camp relied on a set of analytic or quasi-analytic concepts and techniques
concerned with intimate self-discovery. During such exercises, the confessing in-
mate would occupy the center of the room, while emotionally prodded by the
room warden and activists to admit “what you did, what you used to think, what
you are thinking now.” On occasion, encouragement was given to focus on the
deepest, most hidden (real or invented) thoughts, dreams, and affects. The in-
vestigators and camp guards at times confirmed themselves that the perfidious
and treacherous thoughts which sometimes existed may not have been entirely
known to the inmates themselves and therefore needed to be “recovered” and
would prove to be a revelation of sorts to the subjects themselves: “First of all,
you will tell your investigator all your . . . dirty thoughts. Every single one of
your betrayals you will pour out to the investigator, every hostile activity and in-
tention . . . . All your thoughts. You need to throw up all your filthy thoughts
and to re-examine them in the hot light of the sun.”43
The idea of “filthy hidden thoughts” that were unknown to the inmates
themselves and had to be forcibly dug up and confronted resembled—and was
most likely inspired by—the Freudian notion of the “unconscious.” Former in-
mate Eva Nahiri described in her interview with writer Danilo Kis in 1989 that
she was instructed to sit for days and write a report (zapisnik), in which she was
to reveal “everything [she] knew and didn’t know, everything [she] dreamed
about,” her entire internal life from the moment she “sucked in her mother’s
milk” until the time of incarceration. The investigators would then decide what
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was relevant and, even more importantly, whether she was lying or not. Others
were asked to write up all of their impressions of the Goli Otok camp and any
associations they had in relation to it. If they mentioned anything remotely neg-
ative, they were placed back in isolation and “under boycott.”44 Soon after his
imprisonment, Kosta Perucica was subjected to torture in order to force him
into an intimate account of his political development and philosophy. In his re-
port, he was instructed to recount his wartime and postwar doubts about the
Party to write “about things that had always been very unclear to me,” but also
to remember every single letter he drafted, every passing conversation he had
had with his colleagues, and the reactions and feelings such conversations eli-
cited in him.45 Although books, paper, and pencils were sorely lacking at other
times, the camp provided willing inmates with all the necessary equipment to
“pour their soul and their feelings out in writing.”46
Former inmate “Caca” remembered a particular form of self-criticism
(raskritikovanje) practised in the female prison camp, in the course of which
“bandits” were required to sit in the center of a circle made up of other, re-
educated inmates, and to discuss the minutiae of their sexual lives, feelings, and
fantasies and to describe physical relationships and experiences with husbands,
boyfriends, and colleagues. In a strongly patriarchal setting, this “exercise” inevi-
tably served to further humiliate and mortify those considered recalcitrant.
Again, there seems to have been a warped application here of the psychoana-
lytic insistence upon the central role of sexual experiences and drives in the
constitution of human personality.
The prisoners had little choice but to engage, therefore, in re-evaluations
and re-assessment of their own motives, desires, and longings and to re-interpret
their past relationships with their family members and others close to them, in
the service of this entwined political and psycho-pathological model. Even os-
tensibly trivial inclinations and acts were to be “poured out” and examined,
searched as indicators of particular personality traits. This was meant to lead to:
“sharpening the criteria, a true transformation, into a man more conscious and
more awake than before. Being at Goli Otok creates new people out of us. That
new man realizes how naive and blind he was before. Old facts are re-evaluated
in a new light. That’s why it’s normal for the investigation [istraga] to be re-
newed [and open] all time.”47 The road of self-discovery was supposed to lead ul-
timately to a more satisfying and self-conscious form of living and to overcome
inner alienation: “Your entire previous life was one large mistake. You looked
around, you saw nothing. You listened superficially, you understood nothing.
For some this will be the end, for others real life is only just starting. Life full of
clear and sharp views, full of meaning.”48 This insistence on self-exploration as
a path to a higher quality of life and a more fulfilling sense of identity imbued
official Goli Otok rhetoric with a warped sense of care and love for the inmates:
all the brutality could be justified and endured if it served such a lofty psychoan-
alytic aim and if it fundamentally rested on this proclaimed respect for the fallen
Communists’ personalities and on their eventual salvation.
The camp authorities regularly incited—often violently forced—the in-
mates to “remember” events from their past lives; communications, relations,
and encounters with certain people; their impressions, feelings, or reactions to
particular ideas or news. Partly, the purpose of constantly revisiting these reports
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and confessions was to achieve this “remembering” of crucial events that the in-
mates may have omitted on purpose, forgotten or repressed.49
In the end, all inmates had to share their new realization that they had al-
ways been “spineless, cowards, without any memorable merits for the broader
community.” As one inmate reportedly declared: “My greatest disappointment
in the conflict between our two parties was not the break between them but a
division in my own soul. I believed my entire life that I had been brave . . . but
only after the Resolution was declared did I understand what a coward I have al-
ways been.” At Goli Otok he realized that he became a traitor to the Party be-
cause he had been afraid of the Red Army’s invasion. Moreover, he was stunned
to discover yet another hidden motive: “My next big weakness is my enormous
thirst for power. I was hoping to become an editor-in-chief when the Russians
arrived.”50 In a similar vein, Cenic felt forced to admit that only in prison did
she finally understand that writing her diary, in which she expressed some criti-
cisms of Tito, had been an act of political betrayal.51
According to most of the inmates’ testimonies, the ultimate result—and
possibly one of the aims—of Goli Otok’s measures was not so much re-integra-
tion but in effect the disintegration of the prisoners’ personality through self-
analysis: “this perfidious, destructive self-analysis [led to a] demolishing of all life
motifs. Convinced of the power of time they have, gradually and patiently they
will take [the prisoner] from a rational critical attitude to the self, to pathologi-
cal contempt for both his own personality and his closest environment.”52
Liberation through Self-Management
The concept of democratic self-management was also at the core of
Yugoslav psychoanalysts’ and psychiatrists’ liberal turn in the 1950s. The very
same combination of self-management and psychotherapeutic and psychoana-
lytic methods developed in “civilian” child psychiatry, where it was applied in
pursuit of radically different aims, which centered on individual liberation and
self-realization through self-exploration and discovery. When Yugoslavia began
forging closer political, social, and cultural relations with Western Europe and
the United States, it was psychiatry, psychotherapy, and psychoanalysis in par-
ticular that profited the most from this exchange, and these professions became
thoroughly Westernised and firmly integrated in these alternative networks.53 In
the course of this transformation of the Yugoslav mental health professions, psy-
chiatrists and psychoanalysts became primarily concerned with the issue of au-
thoritarian family relations, aiming to liberalize and democratize society by
democratizing the family.54 This was by no means an isolated development: as
Till Van Rahden has convincingly argued, in West Germany the idea that de-
mocracy ultimately rested on egalitarian and antihierarchical family practices in-
creasingly gained ground from the 1950s on. A broad range of intellectuals and
other public figures insisted that “patriarchal-authoritarian” understandings of
fatherhood inhibited the development of democratic consciousness and fostered
fascistic and militaristic political choices. For many in Central Europe, then, the
concept of political power was tightly related to ideas of fatherhood and familial
authority, and attempts to democratise the social and cultural practices of the
national public inevitably involved the promotion of new models of family
relations.55
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Yugoslavia offered an excellent site for social experimentation in this re-
gard: through the combination of the country’s more open version of socialism
and Western psychoanalysis, psychoanalysts hoped to achieve a more humane
society, neither capitalist nor Stalinist, a society deeply committed to human
emancipation and autonomy that invoked early Marx as its ideological beacon.
Individual self-realization was to be achieved only in a self-managing society—
in which truly free, authentic, diversely educated workers and citizens took part
in making all important decisions regarding their political, social, economic, cul-
tural lives.56 In other words, Yugoslav psychiatrists and psychoanalysts wanted
to create a society devoid of hierarchies, patriarchy, and social and political au-
thoritarianism; a combination of psychoanalytic psychotherapy and self-
managing socialism was the key, and the experience of psychoanalytic treatment
as well as the political conditions of anti-authoritarian self-management were
supposed to transform the “primitive” and dictatorial Yugoslav psyche. In that
sense, self-management—whether it was developed in an authoritarian context,
or in the course of discussions regarding anti-Stalinism and liberalization—
remained the mark of originality of Yugoslav psychiatry and psychoanalysis and
provided the basis on which the postwar psychiatric understandings of the hu-
man psyche and its possible transformation rested.
The continuing importance of self-management within Yugoslav psychiatry
indicates another important trait of the profession: its ongoing political involve-
ment with the ideas and practices of reform Communism and its participation in
explicitly political discussions. Vladislav Klajn remained an influential figure of
Yugoslav mental health sciences throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and his stu-
dents and mentees from “Dragisa Misovic” availed themselves of the opportuni-
ties offered to them by the country’s opening up to the West. Klajn was also one
of the very few surviving disciples of Yugoslavia’s first trained psychoanalyst
Nikola Sugar—the other one was leading child psychoanalyst Vojin Matic—
and thus decisively shaped the increasingly liberal field of Yugoslav psychoanaly-
sis and psychotherapy. While Klajn was very close to the Communist Party,
Matic and a subsequent generation of younger, Westernised psychoanalysts were
politically engaged in a different way: no dissidents, they forged strong personal
and intellectual connections with Praxis, a group of humanist Marxists intellec-
tuals who harshly criticized what they saw as a limited emancipatory potential of
Yugoslav reform Communism. While Yugoslavia’s most well-known political
dissidents, philosophers, and sociologists gathered around Praxis complained that
workers’ self-management failed to reach its full potential, psychoanalysts made
that very same point—and much earlier on—but were never persecuted.
Child psychiatrists and psychoanalysts in Yugoslavia were particularly con-
cerned with the great demands of modernity and of the new democracy in
Yugoslavia, which required increasing personal responsibility and exceptional
mental stamina. Vojin Matic, for instance, articulated a very telling understand-
ing of the role of individuals in a socialist society. He conjured up a memorable
image of experimental direct democracy and emphasized the supreme role of psy-
chiatry in preparing the population for it: “We are entering a society in which
every individual carries his share of responsibility, in which awareness, pleasure
derived from labour, and true personal dedication are more necessary than ever,
in which every individual will make decisions about economic, foreign, internal
policies, about war and peace. In such a society, every individual should be
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raised in such a way as to be able to be involved in a community without fear or
aggression, keeping the originality of his personality and feeling of personal free-
dom.”57 This utopian vision drew directly on Marx’s “German ideology,” which
also served as the ideological foundation of the new platform of workers’ self-
management, as evidenced by Kardelj’s contemporaneous injunction that social-
ist Yugoslavia should “constitute a free and courageous man whose worldviews
and concepts were broad and diverse, and who was foreign to bureaucratism and
narrow formalism of thinking.”58
And indeed, in socialist Yugoslavia the issue of massive social and individ-
ual restructuring was high up on the political agenda. In particular, the elimina-
tion of patriarchal families was to be at the core of the social revolution and the
true emancipation of self-managing socialism. Patriarchal psychodynamics gen-
erated an authoritarian father, an obedient and inconsequential mother, and
highly hierarchical, disciplinarian relationships with children. Socialism, on the
other hand, was to bring about the emancipation (political, social, personal) of
women and to introduce egalitarianism in family relations. However, in
Yugoslavia the entrenchment of traditional family authoritarianism belied the
achievement of such lofty democratizing aims within families, and it also fatally
harmed the process of raising self-managing citizens. Moreover, if the Yugoslav
psychiatrists looked east, they could see a very traditional and authoritarian, cus-
todial psychiatry, which could not provide any meaningful guidance when it
came to re-educating parents. Paradoxically, it was in Western psychoanalytic
and psychiatric ideas that Yugoslav child psychiatrists discovered a set of guide-
lines for eliminating familial pathologies and for creating a more humane ver-
sion of socialism. Psychoanalysis, in particular, became the key intellectual tool
for making families and parent-children relationships more socialist and more
self-managing. In Yugoslav child psychiatric circles of the 1950s and 1960s, psy-
choanalysis was seen as “a democratic, liberating psychotherapy, which stands
for independence and personal liberties of individuals.”59 As psychotherapist
Vladeta Jerotic later confirmed, psychoanalysis coupled with self-analysis pre-
sented a unique way to achieving unsurpassed human autonomy, self-actualiza-
tion, and educational growth: unlike traditional psychiatry, it educated without
relying on authoritarianism and, by increasing patients’ self-knowledge, “created
pre-conditions for the constitution of a mature and autonomous personality”
and for attaining the “freedom of self-development.” For Jerotic, the ethics of
psychoanalysis required that practitioners shun any attempts at manipulation or
indoctrination and focus on advancing a democratic dialogue with the patient.60
For these reasons, a society of true socialist self-managing workers was in fact im-
possible without psychoanalytic guidance.
The new socialist family in Yugoslavia was supposed to raise future self-
managers and liberated workers, and it had the greatest responsibility in effect-
ing this grand transformation of psychological consciousness and social practice.
As one treatise argued in the 1950s, the family remained the first school of hu-
man emotions and of new, revolutionary social relations, which prepared both
children and parents for their new social and productive roles and which there-
fore had to rest on the ideals of independence and lack of exploitation.61
Moreover, patriarchal morality prevented people from becoming active partici-
pants in self-managing systems because it discouraged initiative and control from
the bottom and produced personalities who tended to wait passively for orders
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and directions rather than taking the lead themselves. The current society in
Yugoslavia demanded “conscientious and well developed personalities who will
be prepared to lead the process of societal transformation,” and families could
not raise such personalities if they insisted on patriarchal mores and fought
against children’s “stubbornness.”62
In their quest to instil in their children blind obedience and subordination
to higher authorities, patriarchal parents became guilty of producing automatons
and weak personalities, who would only be capable of fulfilling other people’s or-
ders. On the contrary, the fledgling Yugoslav society of self-managers needed in-
dependent young people “who thought with their own heads.”63 The dangers of
family authoritarianism were well illustrated in a clinical case treated by Ksenija
Kondic, a young psychologist at Belgrade’s Consultancy for mental hygiene.
Kondic treated a ten-year old girl, Gordana, who had persistent problems with
enuresis, although her family situation at first appeared stable and comfortable.
Still, the psychologist soon noted that the relationship between the parents was
fairly disturbed, but even more importantly, that the father’s harsh treatment of
the girl might be the core of the problem. According to Kondic’s notes, the girl’s
mother confirmed that, unlike his gentle and open attitude towards their son,
“the father was very cold [to the patient], and rigidly stuck to the view that a fe-
male child was less important than the male one.” Moreover, “he wouldn’t let
her play with other children because she belongs at home” as a girl. It was pre-
cisely this lack of concern for the patient’s feelings, itself a result of an inflexible
patriarchal worldview, that produced timid, apprehensive children, unprepared
for any autonomous decision-making. As Kondic concluded, the patient was
growing up to be the kind of person a self-managing society was dreading the
most. Gordana was the perfect image of submission: “she speaks softly, fairly
fearfully, with her hands in her lap, often looking down.” She was obedient,
“never said a word more than she was asked.” Moreover, “she moves exactly as
she speaks—silently, she is barely audible, careful not to touch or move any ob-
ject.” Most damningly, “she never does anything before asking for permission
first.”64
Therefore, Yugoslav psychiatrists argued that the pathology of children was
always fully reducible to the pathology of parents. The problem of rigid parents
was placed at the core of this heated discussion, especially the personality and
pernicious psychological and political influence of authoritarian, harsh, and per-
fectionist fathers (who were most often the first instances of discipline in a
child’s life), who could reportedly be responsible for enormous pathological per-
sonality changes in childhood and could also predetermine a child’s problematic
relationship with law and state. Regardless of whether the child became insecure
or aggressive, problematic family relations robbed the society and state of valu-
able citizens.65 Matic argued that not biology but parents constituted the fate of
children. He and his colleagues used explicitly political terms such as “demo-
cratic” and “undemocratic” families and placed the idea of democratic family re-
lations and their importance at the core of their professional ideology. In
Matic’s opinion “a child who grew up in a democratic family acts in a free way,
is not withdrawn, is normally cheerful. However, a child who grew up in a
nondemocratic family demonstrates in their social behaviour the exact opposite
characteristics.”66 Parents and family relationships tended to crucially determine
not only individual psychological characteristics but also national or cultural
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mentality traits. Authoritarian, traditional, and nondemocratic families thus
constituted an immense political problem and an obstacle on the path towards
self-managing socialism.67
In their dealings with child patients and their parents, Yugoslav psychia-
trists perceived the need to reform the structure of traditional families: at the
Institute for neuropsychiatry of children and youth, for instance, a thirteen-year-
old girl was treated whose mental state deteriorated dramatically after her par-
ents moved in with the paternal grandparents. The psychologist in charge of
this paradigmatic case related the severe decline of the quality of nuclear family
life to this decision of the parents to live in an extended family and highlighted
the pernicious effects that older and more traditional family members might
have on the child’s mental health as well as on the overall relationship between
the child and her parents.68 In an even more dramatic case, an eight-year-old
boy was brought to see a therapist because he kept attempting to commit sui-
cide. The boy lived with his parents and paternal grandparents, which seemed
to reinforce a highly hierarchical family setup: the mother was, according to the
therapist, consistently submissive toward her in-laws, while at the same time be-
ing extremely harsh and intolerant towards the boy. In addition, the boy report-
edly witnessed instances of family violence committed by the alcoholic
grandfather.69
Throughout such psychiatric discussions, patriarchy and authoritarianism
were marked as the authentic cultural traits of the Yugoslav family (and social)
structure, which set it apart in a broader international context. One of the cen-
tral characteristics of the Yugoslav family structure was that “expressions of dis-
obedience and resistance to parents, teachers and other adults, especially if they
were higher up on the hierarchical scale, were condemned and punished, while
obedience and submissiveness were encouraged. Parents and adults were sacred
beings who may not be called in question or disputed.”70 This persistence of pa-
triarchal dispositions within family was further coupled with parents’ reported
insensitivity to finer emotional conflicts of their children and their generally dis-
missive attitude towards their children’s psychological problems. They often did
not recognize such psychological changes in their offspring, were not privy to
compassion, and even proved to be incapable of empathy. Parents were thus in-
structed to listen to children much more carefully, to respond to their questions
and emotions rather than merely lecturing and offering advice, and to not dis-
miss their opinions because “children can understand everything in some way
and everything can be told to them.”71
Many of the Yugoslav child psychiatrists (especially those who underwent
psychoanalytic training) proposed an activist psychoanalysis, which might aban-
don its “aristocratic” position and get involved in proper social change. What
they had in mind was changing the society by revolutionizing family relation-
ships and structures through clinical practice. This unusually activist stance
might be one of the most defining features of Eastern European (socialist) psy-
choanalysis and it was founded on the ideas of self-management and its continu-
ous implementation in both families and society at large. Tadic drew a direct
parallel between a “patriarchal family” and “bureaucratised social” relations,
equating in fact nondemocratic familial arrangements with dictatorial political
structures and concluding that youth needed to liberate itself from both in order
to realize its own authentic emotional, cognitive, social capacities. Family thus
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became yet another experimental site in which hierarchical relations were to be
gradually unraveled and, just as in Goli Otok, patients were to be induced to re-
place them with more egalitarian and self-managing structures. The issue of hu-
man freedom and its relationship to authoritarianism thus came to the very
center of the psychiatric understanding of child and youth psychoanalysis and
psychotherapy. Tadic used a very peculiar terminology to describe the position
of a child psychotherapist who was asked to treat a patient by parents or a state
agency: “a psychotherapist must be aware of a trap, in which they often fall, to
become a protector and advocate of the interests of the family and of the soci-
ety, and to serve their interests uncritically.” This was particularly important be-
cause it was most often the case that the decision regarding psychotherapy was
not made by the patients themselves but by their parents, schools, psychological
centres, etc., who “should take responsibility for their part in the development
of mental disturbances in children and youth.” Furthermore, sending a child to
a therapist could be “the last and most decisive pressure and enslavement.”
Clinical contexts thus turned into arenas for political experimentation and ac-
tivism: “The therapist should not act like a person who offers freedom to the
enslaved while smiling at and encouraging the enslaver” but should instead in-
crease the political awareness and liberation potential of the enslaved.72
The new conception thus emerged of the child psyche as authentic and sep-
arate from adult psychologies—children were to be viewed as personalities, and
psychiatric and psychoanalytic professionals stressed the supreme significance of
warmth, love and respect that needed to be directed at children. As Matic
warned, parents needed to learn that a child was, after all, a very reasonable
creature.73 In fact, if treated with confidence and respect, the child would “be-
come more willing to take responsibility” for his or her own behavior.74 While
the ultimate aim should be cooperation with rather than control over children:
“physical punishments are not only senseless but could also be tragic for the
child.”75 In treating children, it was particularly important that the psychoana-
lyst demonstrate respect, authentic interest, and curiosity and pay painstaking
attention to everything the patient said or did; the therapist thus assumed the
role of a liberator, emancipator. The therapist, moreover, aimed to reduce the
child’s dependency on the parents, while an appreciation of the patient’s opin-
ion needed to be communicated and followed through consistently. Slovene an-
alyst Meta Kramar noted that the “therapist . . . enabled him [the adolescent
patient] to become active in his own life and assume initiative, and above all to
become autonomous in his decisions.” Moreover, the “therapist’s respect for the
patient’s autonomy should be even more firmly embedded in his relationship
with the patient in child psychiatry, because the patient, as a child, was used to
assuming a more passive and subordinated position before adults.”76 In fact, such
psychoanalytic insights provided an excellent framework for political interven-
tions: the therapist needed to help their young patients to “fight for their true
needs and independence,” even if it meant encouraging children and adoles-
cents not to accommodate to the demands of their—flawed—family environ-
ment. Following the lead of Anna Freud, Franz Alexander, and Virginia Axline,
Tadic recommended that analysts and therapists behave as “the good parent,”
correcting the mistakes of patriarchal child-raising, “by accepting the [patient]
exactly as they were, with their good and bad traits, by listening carefully and
appreciating them without judging, devaluating and condemning them.” In this
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way, therapy could alter children’s and young people’s social potentials and abil-
ities and teach them to engage in social relations differently in the future.77
Conclusion
A complex relationship thus developed between psychiatry/psychoanalysis
and Yugoslavia’s project of building anti-Stalinist socialism. This experiment in
reform Communism was often reliant on psychiatric and psychotherapeutic con-
cepts, as the Goli Otok re-education procedures reveal. But even in “civilian”
psychotherapy, where direct political control was much subtler and more flexi-
ble, the notions of self-management and direct Marxist democracy shaped psy-
chiatric and psychoanalytic discussions to a critical extent. This was particularly
true in the field of child psychiatry, which had much in common with theories
and practices of education and re-education, and which allowed its practitioners
to discuss at length the process of constructing proper political citizens. In fact,
perhaps because of their intense political involvements, Yugoslav psychoanalysts
gradually started to consider their discipline a tool for political and social eman-
cipation. Although European psychoanalysis had traditionally been criticized for
its individualism and social and political isolationism, Yugoslavia’s new brand of
Marxist psychoanalysis forcefully responded to that challenge, fashioning itself
as an explicitly activist science, a vehicle of revolution that started at the level
of individual psyches and families. By revolutionizing and de-Stalinizing family
relationships, it aimed to thoroughly transform the supposedly authoritarian na-
tional psyche and prepare Yugoslav citizens for their future roles in a self-manag-
ing Marxist society. In that sense, psychoanalysts and psychiatrists assumed for
themselves a core political educational responsibility. This democratizing proj-
ect, however, had first been put in practice in the extremely nondemocratic
context of Goli Otok, where the combination of self-managing and psychothera-
peutic procedures and practices aimed to de-Stalinize in an excessively brutal
manner.
This combination of Marxism, violence, liberalism, and Western psycho-
analysis was only possible due to the peculiar political position Yugoslavia en-
joyed in Cold War Europe. In other words, Yugoslavia’s complex international
and political role can be read not only in political and diplomatic history but
also in the fields of psychoanalysis and psychiatry. This is where unexpected alli-
ances crossed the traditional Cold War fault lines most vigorously: Yugoslav
physicians and psychiatrists used their contacts and exchanges with their West
European and American colleagues to introduce new concepts into Yugoslavia’s
long-standing political discussions regarding alternatives to Stalinism. Some of
these concepts likely informed Goli Otok practices, while at the same time thor-
oughly reshaping generations of Yugoslavia’s child psychiatrists and psychothera-
pists. The history of postwar mental health professions in this country opens up
a much larger social and political story of liberalization and authoritarianism in
socialist Eastern Europe: while Yugoslavia remains a special case in the history
of East European socialism, its partial democratization was not incompatible
with a variety of authoritarian practices, which were partly inspired by the coun-
try’s very exposure to Western practices and professional networks. The strict di-
vide between Eastern authoritarianism and Western liberalism broke down, and
ideas, practices, and influences turned out to be more adaptable to different
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ideological contexts than traditional accounts of the Iron Curtain would suggest.
This story shows that Eastern Europe could serve as an experimental ground
for various innovative political or professional combinations and as a meeting
point for ideological concepts, therapeutic models, and medical personnel
from both the Eastern and the Western blocs.
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